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Japan has universal public pension and health insurance coverage. Uni-
versal health care coverage is achieved through a combination of an em-
ployer mandate and regional plans for self-employed and nonworking in-
dividuals.1 Since coverage is universal, whether one is covered is unrelated
to his or her labor supply decision. However, how one is covered is closely
related to his or her employment status. Workers who do not work full-time
may not receive coverage through their employers. In this article, I focus on
one such group of workers: women who work part-time.
Part-time work has expanded rapidly in Japan in the 1980s and 1990s.
According to the Employment Status Survey (Statistical Bureau 1984,
1998), the number of female part-time and arbeit workers increased from
3.9 million in 1982 to 8.3 million in 1997.2 In light of this expansion, labor
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1. The universal public pension is administered under a similar scheme. Most salary earn-
ers are covered through employer-provided plans, whereas the self-employed and farmers are
covered by the national pension program. However, unlike the health insurance system, local
governments have no discretion over the structure of the national pension.
2. Arbeit workers are nonregular employees who usually work shorter hours than regular
employees. When full-time students work for nonregular basis, they usually work under this
title. The distinction between part-time workers and arbeit workers is not necessarily clear,market policies aﬀecting part-time workers have generated increased in-
terest. One such policy concerns social insurance participation. Social
insurance programs (in this case public pension, health insurance, and
employment insurance) do not require all part-time workers to enroll.
Participation is only necessary for workers with suﬃciently high working
hours, earnings, or both. It has been pointed out that many married
women working part-time do not participate in employer-provided plans,
but are covered by their husbands’ insurance. In this case, neither income
taxes nor social security taxes are collected out of the wife’s earnings, but
she is still eligible for health insurance and public pension beneﬁts through
her husband’s coverage. This is problematic in terms of both eﬃciency and
equity.
This policy is distortionary because it creates work disincentives for
married women. It is not equitable because a married woman will receive
beneﬁts even though she (or her husband) does not pay extra insurance
premiums for her beneﬁts. In spite of signiﬁcant interest in this topic, how-
ever, social insurance participation has not been analyzed in a systematic
way. In particular, some argue that participation is low because employers
do not comply with the policy rules, which results in low coverage of part-
timers. Others argue that “free” coverage for low-income wives discour-
ages participation by married women.
In this paper I use microdata on part-time workers to examine enroll-
ment patterns of female part-time workers. I examine enrollment in em-
ployment insurance (EI),3 public pensions (EP),4 and employer-provided
health insurance.5 The conditions for participating in EP and employer-
provided health insurance are the same (for those younger than sixty-ﬁve):
Part-time workers who work thirty hours or more are required to enroll in
public pension and employer-provided health insurance.6The coverage for
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but arbeit workers have less attachment to work than part-time workers in that their tenures
are shorter than those of part-time workers.
3. This program provides unemployment insurance beneﬁts.
4. Since the focus here is private-sector employees, the applicable public pension system is
the employees’ pension.
5. Firms with more than 500 employees often form a health insurance society (HIS). An
HIS self-insures for the health care expenditures of the enrolled employees and their depend-
ents aged sixty-nine or younger. There were about 1,800 HISs in Japan in 1999. Health care
expenditures by people over seventy years old are ﬁnanced under a diﬀerent scheme, but HISs
usually pay signiﬁcant “taxes” (contributions for health services for the elderly) to ﬁnance the
health care expenditures of the elderly. Each HIS sets its health insurance premium rate indi-
vidually within a range set by the government. The monthly premium for an insured employee
is the premium rate multiplied by his or her regular monthly earnings. Employees in smaller
ﬁrms enroll in governmentally managed health insurance (GMHI). This is a large insurance
group consisting of 19.1 million insured employees and 18.2 million dependents. Like the case
of HISs, the GMHI self-insures the enrollees aged sixty-nine or younger.
6. The rule actually states that if a worker works at least three fourths of the working hours
of regular employees in the same establishment, he or she has to enroll in pension and em-
ployer-provided health insurance. Since working hours for regular employees are forty hours
per week, the rule is often stated as such in the text.EI is wider: Workers who work more than twenty hours per week or earn
0.9 million yen or more have to participate in EI.7
Some previous studies argue that social insurance beneﬁts are not pro-
vided for part-time workers due to employer noncompliance.8 However,
such generalizations do not apply uniformly across categories of workers;
this study ﬁnds substantial heterogeneity in participation among part-time
workers. The following analysis suggests that 86 percent of married female
part-time workers who work suﬃciently long hours and earn more than 1.3
million yen per year participate in the three social insurance programs
above. On the other hand, 83 percent of married female part-time workers
with short working hours and low earnings (less than 0.9 million yen per
year) do not participate. Of the 64 percent of married female part-time
workers who fall between these two groups—working twenty to thirty
hours per week, earning 0.9–1.3 million yen or both—43 percent partici-
pated in employer-provided plans in 1995. A more detailed analysis of
these enrollment patterns is presented below.
12.2 Overview of the EI, EP, and Health Insurance Systems in Japan
12.2.1 Participation Rules for Social Insurance Programs
The rules for participating in social insurance programs are summarized
in table 12.1. The Employer Side and Worker Side columns show the re-
quirements imposed on employers and workers, respectively. A number 1
in either of the Employer Side columns indicates that the employer must
oﬀer beneﬁts to the speciﬁed class of employee; a 1 in the Worker Side col-
umn indicates that a worker belonging to the speciﬁed class of employee
cannot be considered a dependent of another family member (for the pur-
poses of social insurance plans) and must enroll in the social insurance
plan by herself.
A worker with weekly hours more than three-fourths those of regular
employees in the same establishment is required to participate in EP and
employer-provided health insurance. However, if a husband participates in
EP and employer-provided health insurance through his employer, his wife
can receive basic pension and health care beneﬁts as a dependent of her
husband, as long as her earnings are less than 1.3 million yen per year and
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7. This is the enrollment condition for EI for short-hour workers that was introduced in
1989. Those who work more than thirty hours per week enroll in EI for regular workers. The
beneﬁts of the two diﬀer, but the premium rate is the same. Eﬀective in April of 2001, the
threshold for the EI enrollment (0.9 million yen) was repealed. Therefore, under the system at
the point of this writing (2002), the cells stratiﬁed by the 0.9 million yen threshold do not ex-
ist any more. Table 12.4 shows the rules at the point of the data used in the analysis (1990 and
1995).
8. Takayama (1997) notes that “part-time workers who earn 1.3 million yen have to enroll
in national pension insurance and pay the premium by themselves” (emphasis added; 135).less than half of her husband’s earnings. For EI, an employee working
more than twenty hours per week and earning more than 0.9 million yen
per year or more is required to participate.
In principle, employers who meet the employer-side conditions must
force workers to participate in the social insurance programs, irrespective of
their worker-side conditions. For example, if a married, female part-time
worker works thirty-ﬁve hours per week and earns 1.2 million yen, the em-
ployer must enroll her in EP and employer-provided health insurance, even
though she could claim beneﬁts from her husband’s coverage. Nonetheless,
the worker-side conditions may aﬀect participation, even conditional on
hours and earnings. Most importantly, as the following analysis conﬁrms,
many female part-time workers satisfy some conditions but not others.
Most of them work reasonably long hours, but their earnings remain below
the threshold for participation in health and EP insurance.
Based on the rules described in table 12.1, I construct nine cells deﬁned
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Table 12.1 Conditions for Enrollment in Social Insurance
Employer
Sidea
Cell Weekly Annual Worker Sideb:
Number Hours Earnings EPH EI EPH
1990 1  22  90
2  22 90–110
3  22 110+ 1
4 22–33  90
5 22–33 90–110 1
6 22–33 110+ 1 1
7 33+  90 1
8 33+ 90–110 1 1
9 33+ 110+ 1 1 1
1995 1  22  90
2  22 90–110
3  22 110+ 1
4 22–33  90
5 22–33 90–110 1
6 22–33 110+ 1 1
7 33+  90 1
8 33+ 90–110 1 1
9 33+ 110+ 1 1 1
Notes: An entry of 1 on the ﬁrm side means enrollment is required. An entry of 1 on the
worker side means that the worker cannot qualify as a dependent of another family member
and thus must enroll in social insurance individually.
EI = employment insurance
EPH = employees’ pension and Health Insurance
aMust enroll.
bCannot qualify as a dependent.by pairs of ranges in weekly hours and annual earnings. They are num-
bered from one to nine (the second column of table 12.1). The cells diﬀer
by whether they meet the conditions for enrollment. For example, workers
in cell 1 (the top row for each year) do not satisfy the enrollment conditions
for any of the insurance programs considered here; workers in cell nine sat-
isfy hours and earnings conditions for participating in all of the programs.
In the analysis below, I classify the observations in my sample into these
cells. It is important to bear in mind that measurement error in both hours
and earnings might cause misclassiﬁcation.
12.2.2 Costs Associated with Social Insurance Programs
Participation in social insurance programs requires contributions by
both the employer and the employee. For some employers there are costs
associated with paying for the beneﬁts. However, beneﬁts are paid out of
collected premiums (and accrued interest), so they are not necessarily at a
cost to employers. In 1990–1995 (the period for the data used in this paper),
employees’ pension funds (EPFs) and health insurance societies (HISs)
were required to pay beneﬁts, and the value of contributed premiums are
not equal for some workers. Most importantly, it is expected that costs will
be higher for older workers, although the insurance premium rate does not
depend on age.9
Insurance Premium Costs
Social insurance enrollees have to contribute a ﬁxed proportion of their
regular monthly earnings as insurance premiums. The premium rate is
17.35 percent for EP (for 1996–2002), approximately 8.5 percent for em-
ployer-provided health insurance, and 1.15 percent for EI (for 1993–2000).
In nominal terms, ﬁrms pay half of the EP insurance premium and also ap-
proximately half of the employer-provided health insurance premium. For
EI, the premium rate is 0.75 percent for ﬁrms and 0.4 percent for workers.
Regular monthly earnings are approximately equal to monthly earnings if
the latter fall within government-speciﬁed lower and upper bounds.10 For
EP, the lower bound is 92,000 yen per month and the upper bound is
590,000 (ﬁgures are for 1994–2000). For health insurance, the lower bound
is 92,000 yen per month and the upper bound is 980,000 (ﬁgures are for
1994–2000). Those who earn less than the lower bound pay an insurance
premium and receive EP beneﬁts as if their earnings were equal to the lower
bound. Similarly, the premium amount and EP beneﬁts for employees with
earnings above the upper limit are based on the value of the upper bound.11
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9. For pensions, this is the same concept as the low marginal tax rate for old employees, as
pointed out by Feldstein and Samwick (1992).
10. Bonus payments are not included in regular monthly earnings.
11. The upper bound is similar to the maximum taxable earnings in the U.S. Social Secu-
rity program.Costs Associated with Paying Beneﬁts
Most studies of costs of social insurance to the ﬁrm focus exclusively on
the ﬁrm’s insurance premium payments. They treat these as taxes on labor
income and argue that ﬁrms are reluctant to enroll part-time workers in so-
cial insurance programs because of these taxes.12 However, there are im-
portant additional costs to the ﬁrm arising from beneﬁt payments to the
ﬁrm’s enrollees and retirees.
Under the current system, ﬁrms with EPFs or HISs directlypay a part of
beneﬁts to their enrollees.13 The EPFs pay the earnings-related portion of
the EP beneﬁts and corporate pensions to retirees. The HISs self-insure
health care costs for enrollees less than seventy years old. The required ex-
penditure for these beneﬁts may diﬀer substantially across individuals. On
the other hand, premium rates for EP and employer-provided health in-
surance are not allowed to vary across employees. Under such systems,
ﬁrms with EPSs or HISs will care about whom they include in their insur-
ance plans. For example, if a ﬁrm hires a sick worker on a full-time basis,
the health care expenditure of that worker may exceed his or her contribu-
tions (insurance premiums). The welfare of other members of the HIS
would fall because of his or her enrollment.
Small ﬁrms are not allowed to form HISs or EPFs. Beneﬁts for enrollees
are paid by government agencies (the Social Insurance Agency [EP] or the
Governmentally Managed Health Insurance (GMHI). So once employers
pay insurance premiums for their employees to the government, the gov-
ernment will pay all beneﬁts to employees. Firms do not have to worry
about the costs of paying beneﬁts.
In principle, if the costs of paying beneﬁts are shifted to insurance pre-
miums (with higher-cost employees paying higher premiums), social in-
surance participation should not be aﬀected by worker characteristics that
are associated with higher beneﬁts. If shifting is possible, ﬁrms will be in-
diﬀerent between hiring high-beneﬁt workers and low-beneﬁt workers (as-
suming the only diﬀerence between the two groups is social insurance
costs). However, full shifting means wages depend on health status. As ex-
plained above, the premium rate is not allowed to vary across workers. It
would probably be diﬃcult to fully shift the costs needed to pay beneﬁts
onto wages. In the appendix, the cost structure of beneﬁt payments of large
ﬁrms is discussed in more detail.
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12. These arguments ignore the fact that a portion of ﬁrms’ taxes may be shifted to em-
ployees in the form of lower wages.
13. Strictly speaking, the entities that pay beneﬁts to a ﬁrm’s employees and retirees are the
HIS (for health care) and the EPF (for the form of corporate pension relevant here), which
are distinct from the ﬁrm. However, since these organizations handle all the health care and
corporate pension payouts to the employees and retirees of the ﬁrm, I treat them as the same
entity as the ﬁrm.12.2.3 Predictions of the Enrollment Patterns 
of Female Part-Time Workers
In light of the cost structure of social insurance beneﬁts, I look for evi-
dence of two eﬀects on participation behavior: the marital status eﬀect and
the age eﬀect.
Marital Status Eﬀect
As shown in table 12.1, marital status is not included in the criteria for
participation in any of the three insurance programs. Nevertheless, the fact
that married women could receive beneﬁts through their spouse’s coverage
may reduce participation if their earnings and hours do not exceed the
statutory thresholds. Furthermore, if noncompliance exists, it is most
likely to occur in cases where workers lose little from nonenrollment. For
these reasons, married women should be less likely to participate in EP and
health insurance programs than single women. However, diﬀerences across
marital status should be small for participation in employment insurance.
Age Eﬀect
Older workers are less likely to participate in EP and health insurance,
especially in large ﬁrms. This is because large ﬁrms are more likely to form
EPFs, HISs, or both, so they are more likely to be concerned with the costs
of paying beneﬁts, which are higher for older workers. Hence, employers
are more reluctant to include old part-time workers in their ﬁrm-based
plans.
12.2.4 Comparison with the U.S. System
The social security systems in the United States and Japan diﬀer in many
ways. This section summarizes the diﬀerences that are relevant for women
with low earnings—the focus of this paper.
First, under the Japanese system, enrollment in EP (the counterpart of
U.S. Social Security) is tied to enrollment in employer-provided health
insurance for private-sector wage and salary earners. Enrollment in EP
means that the employee is eligible for health care beneﬁts. For 1997–2002,
if a married woman has her own coverage, the coinsurance rate is 20 per-
cent;14 if she is covered by her husband’s insurance, the coinsurance rate is
30 percent. This is an important diﬀerence from the United States, where
paying payroll tax is not directly related to the employee’s health insurance
coverage.
Second, most private-sector employees are subject to paying payroll
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14. Before 1997, if the wife had her own coverage through her employer, the coinsurance
rate for outpatient expense was 10 percent. It rose to 20 percent in 1997. It is scheduled to be
30 percent (so there is no advantage for having own coverage as opposed to being covered as
a dependent) after April 2003.taxes in the United States, whereas in Japan, low-income employees are ex-
empt from paying social security taxes. In the United States, low-income
married women are likely to claim social security beneﬁts as their hus-
bands’ dependents, so their labor supply does not directly aﬀect their ben-
eﬁt. Therefore, the net marginal social security tax rate is high for such
married women (Feldstein and Samwick 1992). In Japan, low-income mar-
ried women do not pay social security tax as long as their earnings are be-
low 1.3 million yen per year (this value was eﬀective from 1992 to 2002).
Earnings of married women below this amount are untaxed by the social
security system. Furthermore, if earnings are below 1 million yen per year,
a part-time employee owes no social security tax, no national income tax,
and no local income taxes.15 Thus, married Japanese women with earnings
below the threshold face a zero marginal tax rate.16If their annual earnings
exceed 1.3 million yen, they must pay a lump-sum social security tax (so at
this point their marginal tax rate is inﬁnity). They also face a very high mar-
ginal tax rate beyond this point (over 37 percent, under certain circum-
stances).17 Once earnings exceed 1.619 million yen, the employment in-
come deduction becomes more generous, so the marginal tax rate falls.
In sum, under the Japanese system, married women with suﬃciently low
earnings face a social security tax rate of zero. If a married woman’s earn-
ings are above the threshold but not very high compared with those of her
husband, she pays social security tax but gains relatively small beneﬁts.
This latter case is similar to that of low-income married women in the
United States.
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15. National income tax is not imposed on employees whose earnings are 1.03 million yen
or less. For earnings below 1 million yen, no local income tax is imposed.
16. Since the beneﬁts such married women receive are the same as those enjoyed by non-
working dependent spouses, their marginal tax rate is not negative.
17. The U.S. and Japanese systems diﬀer in the way that beneﬁts for retired couples and sur-
viving spouses are determined. Consider a couple in which both spouses worked in their
prime (and, in Japan, the wife contributed social security tax since her earnings exceeded the
threshold). Assume the husband’s past earnings were much higher than that of the wife. For
simplicity, assume that the husband dies earlier than the wife. In the United States, if the wife’s
past earnings were low, the couple receives a beneﬁt equal to 1.5 times the husband’s beneﬁt
as long as both spouses are alive. If the husband dies, the wife receives the beneﬁt to which the
husband is entitled. In Japan, as long as both spouses are alive, each spouse collects beneﬁts
based on each individual’s contribution. When the husband dies, the wife can choose from
one of three options: (a) three fourths of the beneﬁt to which the husband was entitled; (b) the
beneﬁt to which the wife is entitled through her contributions; or (c) the sum of one half of
the husband’s entitled beneﬁt and one half of the wife’s entitled beneﬁt. If the wife’s past in-
come was low, option (a) dominates the other two. So in Japan, the wife’s contribution leads
to higher beneﬁts as long as the husband is alive. For this reason, under the Japanese system,
if the wife participates in EP (the counterpart of U.S. Social Security) but her earnings are
much lower than those of the husband, the wife’s net social security tax rate is generally lower
than the statutory rate. Furthermore, having her own coverage has the beneﬁt of a reduced
coinsurance rate in health care beneﬁts (see above). However, the ﬁgures in the text are based
on the statutory rate and do not reﬂect these considerations.12.3 Data and Sample
12.3.1 Data and Summary Statistics
The data used in this paper come from the General Survey of Part-Time
Workers’ Conditions (GSPWC; Ministry of Labor 1992, 1997) in 1990 and
1995.18The GSPWC surveys those workers who are treated as part-time or
arbeit workers in the workplace. Therefore, the sample includes nonregu-
lar workers who work long hours. According to the 1997 Employment Sta-
tus Survey (ESS; Statistical Bureau 1998), among female part-time work-
ers who either work less than 200 days per year on regular basis or work
more than 200 days per year, 28 percent work less than twenty-two hours
per week, whereas 31 percent work more than thirty-ﬁve hours per week.19
There is a large wage gap between full-time and part-time female employ-
ees.20 Therefore, deﬁning part-time workers by number of working hours
might mask signiﬁcant diﬀerences between full-time workers and part-
time workers with long working hours. This data set is unique in that it con-
tains information on participation in all three insurance programs men-
tioned above.
The sample is restricted to female part-time workers ages twenty-ﬁve to
ﬁfty-four who (a) were not enrolled in school at the time of the survey;
(b) worked at private-sector establishments in manufacturing, service,
wholesale, or retail industries; (c) were classiﬁed as nonregular workers;
and (d) had nonmissing earnings in the previous year. Weekly hours are
calculated by multiplying hours worked per day by days worked per week,
and so they are measured with error to the extent that working hours per
day vary across days or working days per week vary across weeks.
Before proceeding to the analysis, a discussion on the problems with us-
ing these data for our purposes is in order. First, an employee who works
for an employer for only a short duration (less than one year) is exempt
from enrolling in health insurance, EP, and EI, irrespective of her hours
of work. For this reason, a part-time worker may be legally exempt from
participating in social insurance programs. In fact, about 8 percent of
part-time workers in the sample have worked for their current employer
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18. Explanations on this survey are found in the Ministry of Labor data (1992, 1997).
19. The proportion of less than twenty-two hours per week is higher than the ﬁgures shown
in table 12.3. The possible reasons for this diﬀerence are (a) sample selection in this paper is
restricted in certain ways; (b) the diﬀerences in ways that weekly hours are obtained; and (c)
the GSPWC is an establishment survey whereas the ESS is a household survey (the GSPWC
surveys establishments of at least ﬁve employees).
20. This is observed in the ESS. According to the survey, the median of full-time female
workers’ earnings is between 2.5 million and 3 million yen, whereas that of part-time and
arbeit workers is between 0.5 and 1 million yen (earnings are recorded in intervals in this
survey).for less than one year. Second, there may be measurement error in hours
and earnings. In particular, the earnings ﬁgures in the survey are those for
the previous calendar year, but hours are for the survey year. If labor
supply behavior in the survey year diﬀers from that of the previous year,
the earnings in the two consecutive years may diﬀer. For our purposes, if
the previous year’s earnings do not exceed the threshold but earnings
in the survey year do, there will be a misclassiﬁcation in assigning obser-
vations into the cells deﬁned in table 12.1. However, in a cross-sectional
survey, it is not easy to collect contemporaneous information on annual
earnings and social insurance participation status; to get both for the
same calendar year, participation status and earnings of the previous year
must be recorded.
Summary statistics for the sample are presented in table 12.2. The top
panel of the table shows the pattern of social insurance participation by
marital status for each year. Participation in at least one program increased
for both married and single women between 1990 and 1995. For married
women, the proportion of those who did not participate in any of the pro-
grams declined by 12 percent, while for single women the same proportion
declined by 7 percent. However, the proportion of those participating in all
three of the programs stayed roughly constant for both married and single
women.
There are clear diﬀerences in participation patterns between married
and single women. Although 49 percent of married women did not partic-
ipate in any of the programs in 1995, only 27 percent of single women fall
into this category. The share of those participating in EP and health insur-
ance is 37 percent for married women and 66 percent for single women (the
sum of the EPH Only column and the All Insurance column in table 12.2).
So married female part-time workers are less likely to be covered by
employer-provided plans. The reasons for this are (a) married women
work fewer hours than single women, and (b) among those who work a
similar number of hours, married women are less likely to participate than
single women. The relative importance of these factors is examined below.
The bottom panel of table 12.2 shows the distribution of social insurance
participation by whether the ﬁrm requires medical checkups at the time of
hiring or on a regular basis.21Firms who have more part-time workers par-
ticipating in employer-provided health insurance plans may be more con-
cerned about the health status of their workers and so may be more likely
to require medical checkups. On the other hand, whether a ﬁrm provides
medical checkups should not be related to participation in EI because
workers’ health status is not related to the ﬁrm’s burden of providing EI.
The pattern shown in the panel is consistent with this hypothesis. Health
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21. The provision of a medical checkup is surveyed at the establishment level. Here that in-
formation is merged with personal information.Table 12.2 Summary Statistics for Female Part-Time Workers Aged 25–54
Marital No EI EPH All Sample
Status Insurance Only Only Insurance Size
Summary of Social Insurance Participation by Marital Status, 1990
and 1995 (%)
1990 Married 60.70 6.76 1.46 31.07 13,183
1990 Single 33.98 5.76 3.37 56.89 1,997
1995 Married 48.78 14.00 6.89 30.33 8,420
1995 Single 26.63 7.82 7.55 58.00 1,538
Health Checkup and Social Insurance Participation, 1995 (%)
Health checkup 
at hiring?
Yes Married 31.52 16.42 3.52 48.55 3,142
Single 11.18 4.98 3.04 80.79 588
No Married 54.88 13.15 8.08 23.89 5,278
Single 32.57 8.91 9.28 49.24 950
Medical checkup on 
a regular basis?
Yes Married 38.41 17.68 3.88 40.03 6,522
Single 15.95 7.29 4.79 71.97 1,133
No Married 67.54 7.34 12.34 12.78 1,898
Single 44.22 8.68 12.08 35.01 405
Summary Statistics, 1990 and 1995a
1990 1995
Married Single Married Single
Income in the 
previous year 99.130 131.174 107.906 143.466
(1.14) (3.195) (1.663) (4.085)
Earnings   1M 0.304 0.609 0.310 0.663
(0.012) (0.018) (0.014) (0.03)
Log hourly wage 6.501 6.564 6.663 6.737
(0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.014)
Weekly hours 31.299 35.374 28.120 33.193
(0.322) (0.497) (0.269) (0.572)
Days worked in the 
previous month 20.750 21.370 19.668 20.492
(0.166) (0.225) (0.118) (0.253)
Age 42.586 39.273 42.736 37.183
(0.135) (0.355) (0.180) (0.602)
Tenure 5.230 4.745 5.449 4.567
(0.104) (0.195) (0.118) (0.221)
Source: Author’s calculations from the Ministry of Labor (1992, 1997).
Notes: The sample is restricted to private-sector employees in manufacturing, service, retail,
or wholesale industries who were classiﬁed as part-time workers, were not enrolled in school,
and had nonmissing earnings data. All insurance = enrollment in EP, health insurance, and
employment insurance. EI Only = enrollment in employment insurance only. EPH Only = en-
rollment in EP and health insurance, but not in employment insurance. No insurance = en-
rollment in none of the three.
aStandard errors are in parenthesis.insurance participation is higher for employers with health checkups:
Forty-four percent of married female part-time workers in establishments
that provide regular health checkups participated in health insurance,
whereas only 25 percent participated in establishments without regular
health checkups.
12.3.2 Changes in Wage and Labor Supply from 1990 to 1995
The second panel of table 12.2 contains summary statistics for earnings
and hours by marital status. These data reveal that weekly hours decreased
by about two to three hours from 1990 to 1995, while hourly wages rose by
16 to 17 percent. The hourly wage increase is close to the growth rates of
regional minimum wages during this period, which averaged 17 percent.
Importantly, earnings did not grow by as much as hourly wages.
Figures 12.1and 12.2present the earnings distribution by marital status.
As noted in previous research (Higuchi 1995; Nagase 1997; Abe and
Ohtake 1997, among others), a tax-free ceiling of 1 million yen has sig-
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Fig. 12.1 Earnings distribution in 1990 and 1995: Married women
Source: Author’s calculations from the GSPWC data.
Fig. 12.2 Earnings distribution in 1990 and 1995: Single women
Source: Author’s calculations from the GSPWC data.niﬁcant eﬀects on the labor supply of married women.22 Married women’s
earnings are concentrated around 1 million yen, but earnings of single
women do not exhibit such a clear concentration at that point. Further-
more, between 1990 and 1995 the earnings of married women below the 1-
million-yen ceiling grew. More married women earned between 0.9 and 1
million yen in 1995 than in 1990. However, the fraction earning more than
1 million yen remained unchanged at approximately 30 percent (table
12.2). In response to increases in hourly wages, married women reduced
their hours, so their earnings remained constant in nominal terms.
Earnings of single women did not grow much either. In cross section, it
is clear that single women’s earnings are not as concentrated around 1 mil-
lion yen as are earnings of married women. However, single women also
reduced their hours of work from 1990 to 1995. There are several possible
explanations for this reduction. First, during the period analyzed here,
working hours of full-time workers were reduced from forty-four hours per
week to forty hours per week. Even though there has been no legal initia-
tive to reduce working hours of part-time workers, this regulation may
have aﬀected the hours of single female part-time workers, whose hours
tend to be relatively long. Second, some single women receive transfer in-
come, which is means tested. In that case, some of these women may have
reduced their hours in response to the rise in hourly wages. The change in
earnings from 1990 to 1995 can be seen in ﬁgures 12.3 and 12.4, where I
plot 1990 earnings multiplied by 1.17 and actual 1995 earnings, by marital
status. Since wages rose 17 percent on average, had hours remained at their
1990 levels, nominal earnings would have grown by 17 percent. However,
as the ﬁgures reveal, actual 1995 earnings are concentrated in a lower range
for both married and single women.
Table 12.3 shows the share of the sample in each of the nine hours-
earnings cells deﬁned by the hours and earnings thresholds for social in-
surance participation (see table 12.1).23 The ﬁgures in some cells are quite
small. For example, the share of workers who work less than the EI mini-
mum hours (twenty-two hours per week in 1990 and twenty hours in 1995)
and earn more than the EI minimum earnings (0.9 million yen per year) is
less than 3 percent in all four samples. As shown in table 12.3, female part-
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22. For earnings up to 1,030,000 yen, a wage earner owes no income tax. For that reason,
work disincentives for a part-time worker are often described as the “1.03 million yen ceiling,”
because such workers try to constrain their earnings to be below 1.03 million yen. The value of
the ceiling used to be 1 million yen, so it is sometimes called the “1 million yen ceiling” as well.
23. Higuchi (1995) is one of the earliest studies to calculate social insurance enrollment of
part-time workers. He tabulates enrollment rates for health and pension insurance as well as
employment insurance for married women of diﬀerent earnings levels. He ﬁnds that partici-
pation rises sharply from the 0.9–0.99 million yen range to the 1–1.09 million yen range, and
argues that ﬁrms may use 1 million yen as the threshold for enrollment in EP and health in-
surance, even though the threshold in the statute is 1.3 million yen. It seems that he misun-
derstood the statutory threshold in 1990, believing it to be 1.3 million yen, which is the thresh-
old after 1992, even though it was in fact 1.1 million yen in 1990.Fig. 12.3 Earnings distribution for married women
Source: Author’s calculations from the GSPWC data.
Fig. 12.4 Earnings distribution for single women
Source: Author’s calculations from the GSPWC data.time workers work relatively long hours. In 1995, only 13 percent of mar-
ried female part-time workers worked less than twenty hours per week,
whereas 49 percent worked thirty hours or more.
From 1990 to 1995 there were large changes in the distribution of work-
ers over the nine cells, especially for married women. The share earning less
than 0.9 million yen per year declined for both married and single women.
Due to the increase in hourly wages, it became easier to earn higher in-
come. However, many married part-time workers wanted to constrain their
earnings to be less than 1 million yen per year, so the share earning more
than 1 million yen remained constant. The changes in the share of workers
in each cell in table 12.3 are further complicated by changes in threshold
hours. The reduction in the hours threshold acts to increase the share of
workers satisfying the conditions for participation. The tendency to con-
strain labor supply works in the opposite direction, increasing the share of
workers who need not enroll.
12.4 Results
12.4.1 The Degree of Noncompliance
Conditional on meeting the participation criteria, noncompliance
may be more common among married women than single women.24
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Table 12.3 Distribution of Hours and Earnings by Marital Status, 1990 and 1995 (%)
1990 1995
Cell Weekly Annual Weekly Annual
Number Hours Earnings Married Single Hours Earnings Married Single
1  22  90 12.84 5.26  20  90 9.02 5.58
2  22 90–110 2.78 1.28  20 90–130 2.95 0.67
3  22 110+ 0.56 2.44  20 130+ 0.55 1.41
4 22–33  90 21.47 10.67 20–30  90 17.26 6.79
5 22–33 90–110 11.75 5.28 20–30 90–130 19.17 6.13
6 22–33 110+ 5.70 7.06 20–30 130+ 1.97 3.98
7 33+  90 12.06 9.16 30+  90 8.95 8.24
8 33+ 90–110 10.13 10.45 30+ 90–130 19.47 18.74
9 33+ 110+ 22.72 48.39 30+ 130+ 20.64 48.46
Source: Author’s calculations from the Ministry of Labor (1992, 1997).
Notes: The sample is restricted to female part-time workers aged twenty-ﬁve to ﬁfty-four. Annual earn-
ings are measured in 10,000 yen.
24. Most of the analysis in this paper is concerned with enrollment in social insurance con-
ditional on labor supply choices. If enrollment behavior were uniform conditional on hours
and earnings only, labor supply decisions would basically determine social insurance partic-
ipation, so there would be no reason to analyze participation conditional on earnings andTable 12.4 presents 1990 and 1995 participation shares for each of the
nine hours-earnings categories. The table lists the results separately by
marital status, as labor supply and participation behavior diﬀer between
these two groups. Social insurance participation is clearly related to
earnings and hours. The share of married women who did not participate
in any of the social insurance programs in 1990 is over 97 percent in cell
one (weekly hours less than twenty-two and earnings of less than 0.9 mil-
lion yen), while the same share for cell nine (weekly hours of more than
thirty-three and earnings of more than 1.1 million yen) is 10.7 percent. A
similar pattern is observed in other groups. So, although noncompliance
may exist to some extent, it is not as widespread as some previous re-
search suggests.
In all four samples, almost 80 percent of workers in cell nine participate
in all three programs (EP, health insurance, and EI). In this group, married
women are no less likely to participate than single women: The option for
married women to receive beneﬁts from their husbands’ coverage does not
seem to aﬀect participation in this range.
For cells seven and eight, nonparticipation is signiﬁcantly higher for
married women than for single women. In 1995, 46 percent of married
workers in cell eight did not enroll in any of the insurance programs, com-
pared to 22 percent of single workers. The proportion of workers in cell
eight who participated in all of the insurance programs is 31 percent for
married women and 52 percent for single women. The larger drop in par-
ticipation in EP and health insurance from cell nine to cell eight for mar-
ried women than for single women suggests that “worker-side conditions”
signiﬁcantly aﬀect participation by married women.
Those in cell eight satisfy the conditions for EI participation, yet only 48
percent of married women participated in EI in 1995, whereas 69 percent
of single women did. Participation in EI therefore seems to be aﬀected by
marital status. Thus, conditional on being in cell eight, EI participation is
also correlated with participation in EP and health insurance. In any case,
EI participation is not very high among those who satisfy the conditions
for EI only (cell ﬁve)—for married women, it was 30 percent in 1990 and
43 percent in 1995. Even though EI is mandated for a wider class of part-
time workers than are EP and health insurance, EI coverage may not be
fully enforced.
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hours. As the following analysis shows, however, social insurance participation seems to be
aﬀected by variables like marital status, age, and ﬁrm size, conditional on hours and earnings.
The husband’s employer may check the income of dependent family members carefully to
identify whether they qualify as dependents. If this happens, married women who meet the
criteria are not less likely to participate by themselves than are single women, since the bene-
ﬁt for the wife is denied by the husband’s employer.Table 12.4 Enrollment Behavior Conditional on Weekly Hours and Earnings, 1990 and 1995
Annual No EI EPH All
Cell Weekly Earnings Insurance Only Only Insurance Sample
Number Hours (10,000 yen) (%) (%) (%) (%) Size
1990, Married
1  22  90 97.52 1.58 0.30 0.60 1,276
2  22 90–110 92.57 3.39 1.74 2.30 286
3  22 110+ 76.25 0.65 4.43 18.68 77
4 22–33  90 86.65 7.65 0.91 4.78 2,418
5 22–33 90–110 69.15 15.22 0.90 14.73 1,573
6 22–33 110+ 28.33 5.30 1.06 64.81 870
7 33+  90 71.21 8.83 1.10 18.87 1,270
8 33+ 90–110 57.21 9.46 2.34 30.99 1,159
9 33+ 110+ 10.72 3.12 2.71 83.45 4,254
1990, Single
1  22  90 93.23 5.09 0.00 1.68 71
2  22 90–110 98.97 1.03 0.00 0.00 13
3  22 110+ 87.59 0.00 2.61 9.80 37
4 22–33  90 72.48 8.27 7.13 12.12 145
5 22–33 90–110 54.32 14.83 6.40 24.45 91
6 22–33 110+ 41.61 2.63 2.33 53.44 139
7 33+  90 33.37 4.31 3.29 59.03 174
8 33+ 90–110 24.76 9.38 6.10 59.76 179
9 33+ 110+ 13.40 4.65 2.28 79.67 1,153
1995, Married
1  20  90 83.41 1.41 13.68 1.50 632
2  20 90–130 80.69 7.75 9.23 2.33 269
3  20 130+ 17.00 21.16 23.90 37.95 47
42 0 – 3 0  90 78.59 11.57 5.46 4.38 1,065
52 0–30 90–130 51.25 30.31 5.56 12.88 1,533
62 0–30 130+ 14.08 8.77 7.53 69.62 204
7 30+  90 52.74 18.87 11.29 17.10 662
8 30+ 90–130 46.05 16.67 6.01 31.26 1,646
9 30+ 130+ 6.83 2.98 4.42 85.77 2,379
1995, Single
1  20  90 57.87 0.00 21.43 20.70 56
2  20 90–130 84.87 6.77 8.36 0.00 17
3  20 130+ 55.15 0.00 40.78 4.06 26
42 0 – 3 0  90 77.28 4.59 11.36 6.76 75
52 0–30 90–130 67.47 5.58 11.59 15.36 66
62 0–30 130+ 18.57 3.37 21.68 56.38 44
7 30+  90 44.34 9.65 3.89 42.12 119
8 30+ 90–130 22.10 16.96 8.96 51.97 259
9 30+ 130+ 8.55 6.21 2.84 82.39 881
Source: Author’s calculations from the GSPWC data
Notes: All Insurance = enrollment in EP, health insurance and employment insurance. EI Only = en-
rollment in employment insurance only. EPH Only = enrollment in EP and health insurance, but not in
employment insurance. No Insurance = enrollment in none of the three. For workers under sixty-ﬁve,
conditions for enrollment are the same for EP and health insurance.12.4.2 Decomposition of the Enrollment Diﬀerence into 
Labor Supply Eﬀects and Enrollment Eﬀects
In this section, diﬀerences in enrollment patterns of various groups are
decomposed into several factors. The ﬁrst comparison is that of married
women and single women. This comparison is important because the low
participation rates of part-time workers are partly caused by provisions in
the social insurance system that allow married women to receive beneﬁts
through their husbands’ coverage. Single women do not have such an op-
portunity, so comparing the two groups reveals the eﬀects of the option to
receive beneﬁts from a husband’s insurance.25 I decompose the diﬀerences
into a labor supply eﬀect and an enrollment behavior eﬀect. The former is
the diﬀerence in enrollment due to labor supply choices (hours and earn-
ings), and the latter is the diﬀerence in likelihood of enrollment conditional
on hours and earnings.26
The second comparison is that of 1990 and 1995 participation rates.
Overall, enrollment in social insurance by part-time workers increased be-
tween the two years. As the bottom panel of table 12.2 shows, the propor-
tion who did not participate in any of the three social insurance programs
declined 12 percent for married women and 7 percent for single women.
These overall changes are decomposed into a labor supply eﬀect, an en-
rollment behavior eﬀect, and a rule eﬀect. This last one captures the eﬀect
of the threshold revisions for hours and earnings that took place between
1990 and 1995.
The decompositions are done in the following manner.27 Let L be the
fraction of workers by labor force status in each of the categories deﬁned
by the hours-earnings pairs. The hours-earnings pairs are deﬁned by the
thresholds for participation in EP, health insurance, and EI in each year
(see table 12.1). Denote L1 as the distribution of labor force status of the
group of interest (for example, married women) and L0 as the distribution
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25. Health insurance (but not pension) coverage can be obtained from another insured and
employed family member (for example, from parents). Some single women may have health
insurance coverage in this way. However, in 1990, 57 percent of the single women in the sample
were divorced or widowed. They are probably less likely to receive health insurance from their
parents. The categories of “never married” or “divorced or widowed” were only included in
the 1990 survey.
26. Terming the former a labor supply eﬀect may be a bit misleading because it refers here
to how the probability distribution over the nine cells changed between the two years. The
likelihood of a worker’s being included in each of the cells depends on both hourly wages and
weekly hours.
27. It is possible to perform similar decompositions by using regression coeﬃcients ob-
tained from a model that predicts participation in the two insurance groups (EP and health
insurance, and EI). However, such decompositions are quite sensitive to the estimated coeﬃ-
cients. Unless the estimated parameters predict the outcomes well (here, outcomerefers to the
probabilities of the four states that correspond to participation in the two insurance groups),
such decompositions may not be reliable. For this reason, the decomposition here is based on
simple accounting, which does not use a behavioral model.of labor force status of the comparison group (for example, single women).
Using ito index labor supply categories, Li1in this case represents the frac-
tion of married workers whose labor supply decisions place them in cate-
gory i. Let pjk be the probability distribution over the four participation
states (indexed by j) by workers in the group k (k   0,1). The participation
states correspond to (a) not enrolled in employer-provided health insur-
ance nor EP nor EI; (b) enrolled in EI only; (c) enrolled in employer-
provided health insurance and EP only; and (d) enrolled in all three. Let  ijk
be the probability distribution over the four participation states for those
in the kth group and the ith labor supply status category. Then, the diﬀer-
ence in the probability of being in participation state j between the two
groups can be written as
(1) pj1 – pj0  ∑
i
 ij1Li1 – ∑
i
 ij0Li0  ∑
i
( ij1    ij0)Li1  ∑
i
 ij0(Li1   Li0)
This formula is used to compare the participation patterns of married
women to single women.
In comparing participation in 1990 and 1995, it is necessary to control
for the changes in the participation conditions that occurred. As explained
in section 12.2, the weekly hours thresholds for participation were reduced
between 1990 and 1995. For EP and health insurance, the threshold was
cut from thirty-three hours per week to thirty hours per week; for EI, it was
cut from twenty-two hours per week to twenty hours per week. On the
other hand, the earnings threshold for EP and health insurance increased
from 1.1 million yen to 1.3 million yen; the threshold for EI remained at 0.9
million yen. These factors will change the likelihood of participation even
if hours and earnings are kept constant. To account for this, I decompose
the second term of equation (1) into a term that controls for the changes in
the rules and a term that captures the changes in labor supply distributions.
Speciﬁcally, let L ˜
i0 be the probability distribution over the nine categories
of labor supply choices if the 1995 rules were applied to 1990 hours and
earnings. Then ∑i ij0(L ˜
i0 – Li0) corresponds to the changes in participation
due to the changes in the rule, evaluated at the participation propensity of
group 0 ( ij0). Therefore, in comparing 1990 and 1995 outcomes, the de-
composition becomes
(2) pj1   pj0  ∑
i
 ij0(L ˜
i0   Li0)  ∑
i
 ij0(Li1   L ˜
i0)  ∑
i
( ij1    ij0)Li1.
Here, the subscript 1 corresponds to the 1995 outcome, and 0 to the 1990
outcome. The ﬁrst term is the change in rule term, the second term is the
labor supply term, and the ﬁnal term is the change in participation behav-
ior term.
The results of this decomposition are shown in table 12.5. The changes
in rules have mixed eﬀects on participation: The fall in the hours threshold
and the rise in the income threshold moved the distribution over the nine
Fringe Beneﬁt Provision for Female Part-Time Workers in Japan 357cells in opposite directions. On the one hand, the reduction in the hours
threshold made the fraction of workers who exceeded this threshold go up;
on the other hand, the rise in the earnings threshold for EP and health in-
surance made the fraction of workers in cell nine (who satisfy conditions
for participating in all three programs) fall. The upward adjustment of the
EP and health insurance threshold is comparable to the rate of general
wage increase, so if labor supply decisions had remained the same, the de-
cline in the fraction of workers who meet all the conditions for participa-
tion would not have occurred. However, as shown in table 12.3 and ﬁgures
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Table 12.5 Decomposition of Diﬀerences in Participation Behavior
No Insurance EI Only EPH Only All Insurance
(%) (%) (%) (%)
A. Comparison of Married and Single Women, 1995
Married 48.78 14.00 6.89 30.33
Single 26.63 7.82 7.55 58.00
Diﬀerence 22.15 6.18 –0.66 –27.67
Decomposition
Diﬀerence in labor supply 18.11 –0.24 2.15 –20.01
Diﬀerence in participation 
behavior 4.03 6.45 –2.80 –7.68
B. Comparison of Married Women, 1990 and 1995
Actual 1995 48.78 14.00 6.89 30.33
Actual 1990 60.70 6.76 1.46 31.07
Diﬀerence –11.92 7.24 5.43 –0.74
Decomposition
Diﬀerence due to enrollment 
conditions –0.07 0.59 0.16 –0.67
Diﬀerence in labor supply –0.16 0.52 –0.06 –0.33
Diﬀerence in participation 
behavior –11.70 6.15 5.32 0.23
C. Comparison of Single Women, 1990 and 1995
Actual 1995 26.63 7.82 7.55 58.00
Actual 1990 33.98 5.76 3.37 56.89
Diﬀerence –7.35 2.06 4.18 1.11
Decomposition
Diﬀerence due to enrollment 
conditions –3.33 0.60 0.51 2.24
Diﬀerence in labor supply 0.24 –0.12 –0.36 0.23
Diﬀerence in participation 
behavior –4.25 1.58 4.02 –1.36
Source: Author’s calculations from the GSPWC data
Note: All Insurance = enrollment in EP, health insurance, and employment insurance. EI
Only = enrollment in employment insurance only. EPH Only = enrollment in EP and health
insurance, but not in employment insurance. No Insurance = enrollment in none of the three.
For workers under sixty-ﬁve, conditions for enrollment are the same for EP and health insur-
ance.12.1 and 12.2, part-time workers generally reduced their work hours dur-
ing this period, so their earnings growth was limited. Therefore, the frac-
tions in cell ﬁve (twenty to thirty hours per week and annual earnings of
0.9–1.3 million yen) and cell eight (over thirty hours per week and annual
earnings of 0.9–1.3 million yen) rose. Workers in cell ﬁve are not required
to participate in EP and health insurance, since hours are less than the
threshold. Married women in cell eight are eligible for beneﬁts through
their husbands’ coverage.
Table 12.5, panel A shows the results of a comparison of married and
single women in 1995. Overall, married women are 22 percent more likely
to participate in none of the insurance programs, 6 percent more likely to
participate in EI only, and 28 percent less likely to participate in all of the
programs. A signiﬁcant portion of each of these diﬀerences is explained
by the labor supply term. The labor supply factor predicts that married
women are 18 percent more likely to participate in none of the programs
and 20 percent less likely to participate in all of the programs. Married and
single women diﬀer in participation behavior as well. Married women are
4 percent more likely to participate in none of the programs and 8 percent
less likely to participate in all of them. Table 12.5, panels B and C, show the
1990 to 1995 comparison separately by marital status. Overall, the fraction
participating in none of the programs fell, and the fraction participating in
EI only and in EP and health insurance only went up. For single women,
the fraction participating in EP and health insurance increased only some-
what. For both groups, the fraction participating in all three programs re-
mained unchanged. The changes in distribution from 1990 to 1995 are
largely explained by changes in participation propensity.28
12.5 Social Insurance Participation Behavior at the Individual Level
12.5.1 Base Results
In this section, I examine participation behavior at the individual level.
Speciﬁcally, I look at whether individual participation patterns follow the
predictions made in section 12.2.3. I present probit models that predict
participation. The dependent variable is either a dummy variable that
equals 1 if the worker participates in EP and health insurance and zero oth-
erwise, or a similar dummy for participation in EI. Explanatory variables
include dummies for marital status, age category, and ﬁrm size, as well as
years of tenure and other available controls. If married women are less
likely to participate in EP and health insurance, the coeﬃcient of the mar-
ried dummy will be negative. If older workers are less likely to participate,
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28. Some of the decomposition results are aﬀected by the order of decomposition, but the
general pattern is basically similar.the coeﬃcients of the older age category dummies will be negative. If large
ﬁrms are more likely to comply with the rules or if they tend to provide
higher beneﬁts, the coeﬃcients of the large ﬁrm dummies will be positive.
The four panels of table 12.6 show the regression results from the uni-
variate probit models. Table 12.6, panels A and B, contains results for par-
ticipation in EP and health insurance, and table 12.6, panels C and D, pres-
ents results for EI. Separate regressions are estimated for the sample of
workers who meet the conditions for mandatory participation and for the
sample of workers who do not.29 Since participation patterns diﬀer across
industries, regressions are also run separately by industry (summary sta-
tistics on participation by industry can be found in table 12A.1 in the ap-
pendix).
Table 12.6, panel A, lists the estimates from the sample of workers who
meet the conditions for mandatory participation in EP and health insur-
ance. Among this sample of workers, neither marital status nor age aﬀects
participation. The point estimate of the married dummy is positive, so con-
ditional on satisfying participation conditions, married women are no less
likely to participate in EP and health insurance. The coeﬃcients of the age
dummies are insigniﬁcant, so older workers are no less likely to participate.
Participation is higher in larger ﬁrms. The coeﬃcients on the 1995 year
dummy suggest that the probability of participation increased by 6 percent
in the service industry and by 8 percent in wholesale and retail industries.
In manufacturing, the coeﬃcient on the 1995 year dummy is small and sta-
tistically insigniﬁcant. In 1995, the yen appreciated against the dollar sig-
niﬁcantly, which might have reduced labor demand in manufacturing.
Since shorter work hours would reduce the likelihood of participation,
participation may not have risen in manufacturing despite the general
trend toward increasing participation.
Table 12.6, panel B, shows the estimates from the sample of individuals
who do not meet all of the conditions for mandatory enrollment in EP and
health insurance. As shown in table 12.4, even though participation is not
required, some workers do participate. Participation in this group also in-
creased from 1990 to 1995, especially in the service sector. Here, married
women are less likely to participate than single women. Older workers are
also less likely to participate, suggesting that the higher costs of paying EP
and health care beneﬁts to older workers may forestall participation.30
Table 12.6, panel C, shows the univariate probit results for EI for work-
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29. Regressions presented here are not based on a complete model of labor supply and so-
cial insurance participation. A complete framework would model the hours, participation in
EP and health insurance, and participation in EI decisions simultaneously. Such an analysis
is beyond the scope of the paper.
30. I also estimated a similar speciﬁcation using a subsample of workers in cells seven and
eight. Workers in this sample satisﬁed the employer-side conditions, but not the worker-side




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.ers who meet the participation criteria. Unlike the case of EP and health
insurance, married women are less likely to participate than single women.
As noted in the discussion of summary statistics in section 12.3.1, some
married part-time workers who meet the conditions for EI but not those for
EP and health insurance do not participate in EI, which may aﬀect the re-
sults. This possibility is investigated further below. Most of the age dummy
coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant. This is consistent with the hypothesis that,
since EI costs are not higher for older workers, older workers are no less
likely to participate in EI than younger workers. Again, participation is
higher in larger ﬁrms.
Table 12.6, panel D, lists results for EI for workers who do not meet the
participation conditions. In this speciﬁcation, married women are less
likely to participate and age is not signiﬁcantly related to lower participa-
tion. These patterns are similar to those in table 12.6, panel C.
12.5.2 Correlation between EI Participation and 
EP and Health Insurance Participation
The results from the EI univariate probit model suggest that participa-
tion in EI is inﬂuenced by participation in EP and health insurance. To in-
corporate this eﬀect into the regression models, I estimate a univariate pro-
bit model that uses the sample of workers who meet the conditions for EI
but do not belong to cell nine. These workers are much less likely to par-
ticipate in EP and health insurance. The results are shown in table 12.7. For
this group, the characteristics that discourage participation in health in-
surance and EP (marital status or age) generally seem to discourage par-
ticipation in EI.31 For example, although participation in EI is considered
to be unrelated to marital status, the coeﬃcient of the married dummy in
the wholesale and retail sample in table 12.7 is signiﬁcantly negative. Fur-
thermore, although EI participation is unlikely to be related to age, the
marginal eﬀect of older age dummies in manufacturing is signiﬁcantly neg-
ative. So, even though EI has provisions for short-hour workers that allow
more part-time workers to participate, participation in EI is aﬀected by
factors that are related to participation in EP and health insurance.
12.5.3 Additional Evidence on Participation in Employment Insurance
In section 12.4.2, I showed that the rise in social insurance participation
from 1990 to 1995 is largely due to an increase in participation propensity.
There are two possible reasons for the increase in participation. One is
stricter enforcement of the participation rules. In particular, the short-
hour provision of EI that mandates enrollment by workers with twenty-
364 Yukiko Abe
31. I also estimated an unweighted bivariate probit model for the sample of workers in cell
eight. These workers satisfy the conditions for EI participation, but not the worker-side con-
ditions for EP and health insurance enrollment. The model suggests that the error terms in

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.two to thirty-two hours or more than 0.9 million yen in earnings was in-
troduced in April of 1989 (the criterion was later changed to twenty to
twenty-nine hours per week). As the following data show, enrollment in
this category of EI grew rapidly in the 1990s. As the new system became
better known among ﬁrms and workers, participation in EI may have in-
creased. The second reason is an increased desire to enroll in EP (and
health insurance) by single part-time employees. Starting in 1991, those
aged twenty and above were required to participate in the public pension
program regardless of their earnings. Therefore, a single person without an
employer-provided public pension has to enroll in the national pension
program and pay a premium of about 13,300 yen per month (1999 pre-
mium amount). Before that, participation was voluntary for nonworking
or low-income individuals. This change might have made enrollment in EP
and health insurance at the employer level a more attractive option for
single part-time workers, which might have increased enrollment, leading
to higher enrollment in the EP and Health Insurance Only category. Mar-
ried persons whose spouses enroll in an EP program can be covered with-
out an additional premium (see section 12.2.1).
Here, I present additional evidence on the increase in participation in
EI. I use aggregate enrollment data from EI administrative records. Table
12.8shows the number of women who participated in EI by type of worker
(short-hour or regular) and age group. EI for short-hour workers was ap-
plied to those who worked twenty-two to thirty-two hours per week in 1992
and twenty to twenty-nine hours per week in 1997. Employment insurance
for regular workers was applied to those who worked over thirty-three
hours per week in 1992 and over thirty hours per week in 1997. The ﬁrst
two columns show that, from 1992 to 1997, the enrollment of short-hour
workers more than doubled for those aged forty-ﬁve or over. The next two
columns show the ratio of enrollment to the number of workers who work
twenty-two to thirty-four hours per week, to control for the possibility that
the raw increase in enrollment was caused by an increase in the number of
workers.32 Even controlling for the overall increase in part-time work, en-
rollment of short-hour workers rose signiﬁcantly, especially among older
workers. This is consistent with the rise in participation in EI only shown
in table 12.5. For comparison, changes in the enrollment of regular work-
ers are shown as well (note that part-time workers who work more than
thirty hours enroll as regular workers). Since the data do not have infor-
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32. For our purposes, it is desirable to use the number of workers whose weekly hours are
between the thresholds (twenty to twenty-nine hours per week in 1997). However, such num-
bers are not published in the nationally representative data set. Not many Japanese govern-
mental surveys ask employment status and weekly working hours in the same survey ques-
tionnaire. One such survey is the Special Survey of the Labor Force Survey, but the published
data do not contain ﬁgures for the number of workers who work twenty to twenty-nine hours
per week.mation on EP and health insurance participation or marital status, it is
impossible to assess the eﬀect of the system on participation in detail.
Nonetheless, the ﬁgures suggest that one of the reasons for higher partici-
pation in later years is stricter enforcement of the new rules.
12.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I examine the social insurance participation of a group of
Japanese female part-time workers using microdata. There are four main
conclusions. First, there has been an increase in social insurance partici-
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Table 12.8 Employment Insurance Participation, 1992 and 1997
Ratio of Enrollment




Age 1992 1997 1992 1997
Employment Insurance Participation by Short-hour Workers, 1992 and 1997
 20 1.77 3.17 0.032 0.053
20–24 11.97 20.64 0.082 0.092
25–29 21.73 33.61 0.112 0.143
30–34 24.21 41.64 0.105 0.150
35–39 39.42 66.58 0.107 0.175
40–44 73.08 101.71 0.126 0.208
45–49 59.95 143.17 0.128 0.227
50–54 42.00 94.47 0.124 0.232
55–59 23.41 59.49 0.112 0.197
60–64 13.29 31.29 0.113 0.184
Employment Insurance Participation by Regular-hour Workers, 1992 and 1997
 20 450.04 223.64 0.872 0.793
20–24 2515.78 2191.34 0.862 0.836
25–29 1566.04 1955.48 0.804 0.840
30–34 834.05 1061.05 0.707 0.798
35–39 817.02 861.52 0.648 0.736
40–44 1256.42 984.72 0.698 0.721
45–49 1111.16 1399.15 0.718 0.749
50–54 1047.28 1098.75 0.764 0.778
55–59 768.00 908.48 0.778 0.810
60–64 320.29 387.67 0.725 0.814
Source: Enrollment data are from the Annual Report on Employment Insurance (various
years). Number of workers working twenty-two to thirty-four hours per week are based on
the published data from the Statistical Bureau (1984 and 1998).
Notes: Short-hour workers are deﬁned as working twenty-two to thirty-two hours per week
in 1992 and twenty to twenty-nine hours per week in 1997. Regular-hour workers are deﬁned
as working at least thirty-three hours per week in 1992 and at least thirty hours per week in
1997. Number of workers (in the denominator) is deﬁned as those working at least thirty-ﬁve
hours per week. Many public-sector employees who are not covered by EI are counted in the
denominator. Therefore, the ratio is not the enrollment rate.pation by female part-time workers from 1990 to 1995. This increase is a re-
sult not of changing labor supply behavior, but of increased policy compli-
ance and higher participation by those for whom enrollment is not manda-
tory. Second, conditional on satisfying the participation conditions for EP
and health insurance, married women are no less likely to participate in so-
cial insurance than single women. However, among those who do not meet
the conditions for mandatory EP and health insurance, married women
are signiﬁcantly less likely to participate. The provision that married
women can claim beneﬁts from their husbands’ coverage discourages par-
ticipation by this group.
Third, participation in EI is not very high among those who work twenty
to thirty hours per week and earn 0.9 million to 1.3 million yen. Even
though EI has provisions for short-hour workers that mandate participa-
tion, these provisions may not be very well enforced. Fourth, participation
by part-time workers who meet the conditions for mandatory EP and
health insurance is unrelated to age. Older part-time workers are no less
likely to participate than younger part-time workers. However, among
workers who only partially meet these conditions, older workers are less
likely to participate than younger workers. This latter ﬁnding is consistent
with the hypothesis that paying beneﬁts to older workers is more costly
than paying beneﬁts to younger workers.
Appendix
The Cost of Paying EP Beneﬁts for Firms with EPFs
If a ﬁrm has an EPF, the EPF pays the earnings-related portion of public
pension beneﬁts (except for adjustments for inﬂation and wage increases).
The EPFs are ﬁrm pension plans that pay supplemental pensions for re-
tired employees. The EPFs are closely linked to EP programs through a
system called “substituting the payment of employees’ pension (daiko-
seido).”33 The EP beneﬁt has an earnings-related portion that is propor-
tional to one’s contributions at young ages. If a ﬁrm has an EPF, the earn-
ings-related portion of the beneﬁt (excluding the part for indexation to
wage growth and inﬂation) is paid by the EPF of the ﬁrm. The present dis-
counted value of the future beneﬁts of an older employee is higher than
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33. This had been mandated for the EPFs until March 2002. However, starting April 2002,
the EPFs were allowed to transfer the obligation to substitute the payment of EP to the gov-
ernment. If the ﬁrm transfers, the argument here may not apply. But in 1990 and 1995 (the
years for the data used in this paper), the EPFs were required to substitute the payment, so
the argument here is applicable.that of a younger employee because the beneﬁts for an old employee will be
paid in the near future, whereas those for a young employee will be paid in
the remote future. Therefore, for ﬁrms with EPFs, pension beneﬁt costs of
older employees are higher than those of younger employees. Other things
being equal, ﬁrms may be cautious in hiring older workers because the bur-
den of their pension beneﬁts is greater.
The Cost of Paying Health Care Beneﬁts
If a ﬁrm forms an HIS, the ﬁrm self-insures its employees and depend-
ents younger than sixty-nine (inclusive). However, the insurance premium
rate is not allowed to vary across insured workers within an HIS. There-
fore, healthy workers pay more in premiums than they spend on health
care, while less-healthy workers spend more than they pay. Given this
structure, attracting enrollees with large health expenditures would
weaken the ﬁnancial condition of an HIS. Health expenditures are likely
to vary considerably across individuals. Since old workers are less healthy
than young workers, ﬁrms may be cautious about including old workers in
the HIS. Firms may keep the working hours of old part-time workers low
so that they do not have to include them in the ﬁrm’s health insurance
plan.
Considerations for Part-Time Workers
Conditional on enrollment, there is no diﬀerence in health care beneﬁts
and health insurance premium rates between full-time and part-time work-
ers. In other words, full-time and part-time workers who participate in
health insurance are treated the same.
There is an important diﬀerence between full-time and part-time work-
ers in the ﬁrm portion of the EPFs. Part-timers are usually ineligible for
corporate pension beneﬁts (due to the way ﬁrms typically set up their cor-
porate pension plan). However, part-time workers who work in a ﬁrm
with an EPF must participate in the ﬁrm’s EPF for the purposes of re-
ceiving the earnings-related portion of their pension. If a worker enrolls
in the EPF for more than ten years, the earnings-related portion of her
EP beneﬁts are paid by the EPF (rather than the Social Insurance
Agency). On the other hand, if an employee works for a ﬁrm for less than
ten years, the earnings-related portion is not paid by the ﬁrm’s EPF, but
by  the Association of Employees’ Pension Funds (AEPF). However,
when the worker leaves the ﬁrm, the ﬁrm pays the present discounted
value of the earnings-related portion of the worker’s future beneﬁts to the
AEPF. Since the present discounted value of future beneﬁts are higher for
older employees (because they will start receiving beneﬁts in the near fu-
ture), the pension cost for the ﬁrm in this case is higher for older em-
ployees.
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Table 12A.1 Social Insurance Participation by Industry
No EI EPH All
Marital Insurance Only Only Insurance
Year status Industry (%) (%) (%) (%)
1990 Married Manufacturing 47.35 7.47 1.33 43.85
Service 72.45 3.81 1.02 22.72
Wholesale and retail 65.36 7.77 1.80 25.07
1990 Single Manufacturing 18.27 4.23 1.59 75.91
Service 48.86 6.29 3.31 41.55
Wholesale and retail 33.54 6.25 4.34 55.87
1995 Married Manufacturing 41.92 15.24 5.27 37.57
Service 50.74 10.14 10.23 28.89
Wholesale and retail 51.65 14.76 6.53 27.07
1995 Single Manufacturing 24.11 7.21 4.83 63.85
Service 32.59 5.68 10.50 51.23
Wholesale and retail 23.98 9.27 6.72 60.03
Source: Author’s calculations from the Ministry of Labor (1992, 1997) data.
Notes: EI = employment insurance; EPH = employees’ pension fund.